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Abstract
Recent theories of trade credit argue that ￿rms use it to manage inventories and
more trade credit is used when the goods transacted are specialized. Here we argue
that there is an important interaction between processed inventories and trade credit.
Using a panel of over 500,000 observations for around 82,000 French ￿rms across several
sectors, we ￿nd evidence that as goods are fabricated they become more specialized,
and larger inventories of these (semi) processed goods induce ￿rms to o⁄er more trade
credit. We also ￿nd that as customers process goods the sellers￿ability to salvage and
resell those goods diminishes.
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11 Introduction
Trade credit provides short term ￿nance accompanying the transfer of goods from supplier
to buyer until payment is settled. The recent trade credit literature argues that ￿rms o⁄er
trade credit to manage inventories and that more trade credit is used when the transacted
goods are specialized. In this paper we explore the incentives that the stage of fabrication
of inventories creates for the o⁄er and receipt of trade credit. The key observation we make
is that inventories are more dedicated to their owner once they are processed, altering the
incentives for ￿rms to o⁄er and receive trade credit. First, there is a greater incentive for a
￿rm to sell its goods - on trade credit if necessary - once inventories have been transformed:
there is no going back to suppliers further upstream once goods have been processed to some
degree. This increases the incentive for sellers of partly processed inventories to o⁄er trade
credit. Second, once goods are processed they have less value to the upstream seller if seized
for non-payment, creating a disincentive for sellers to o⁄er trade credit to downstream ￿rms
with large proportions of processed inventories. In other words, the advantages sellers have
over banks in handling seized collateral diminish once goods are processed.
Our paper is connected to three strands in the trade credit literature. First, Burkart
and Ellingsen (2004), Cuæat (2007), and Fabbri and Menichini (2010), demonstrate that
specialized products tie customers and suppliers more closely together since there are fewer
alternative uses for a specialized good (minimizing the incentives of a customer to divert the
input) and fewer alternative suppliers. Second, Emery (1987), Bougheas et al. (2009), and
Daripa and Nilsen (2011), propose that there are incentives for suppliers to subsidize the sale
of goods to customers in order to minimize their own inventory holding costs. Third, Petersen
and Rajan (1997), Longhofer and Santos (2003), and Frank and Maksimovic (2005) argue
that suppliers may have advantages over banks in disposing of assets seized if the customer
does not pay for them (collateral liquidation advantages), because goods that have not been
paid for can be resold through their sales network.
We argue that the stage of fabrication of inventories held by the seller and the buyer
plays an important role in motivating trade credit that has not been accounted for by the
diversion, inventory management, or collateral liquidation theories. We augment the di-
version theory, which is concerned about the nature of the transacted good, with the view
that the good becomes more specialised as it is processed. Similarly, we supplement the
inventory management theory, which considers the incentives to minimize inventory costs,
2with the argument that goods in the pipeline create incentives to sell existing inventory, on
trade credit if necessary. Finally, we propose that the advantages ￿rms have over banks in
collateral liquidation diminish as goods are processed. As Petersen and Rajan (1997, p. 664)
have argued, ￿ The advantage of suppliers over ￿nancial institutions will vary cross-sectionally
depending on the type of goods the supplier is selling and how much the customer transforms
them.￿
We make use of a unique dataset with information on the disaggregation of inventories at
the level of the ￿rm. Using a panel of around 82,000 French ￿rms in several economic sectors,
we explore the e⁄ects of the stage of fabrication of inventories on trade credit o⁄ered and
received. We ￿rst con￿rm the empirical ￿ndings of Cuæat (2007) and Giannetti et al. (2011),
and show that the inventory management theories of Bougheas et al. (2009) and Daripa and
Nilsen (2011) are supported in the data. We then exploit the information on inventories at
di⁄erent stages of fabrication (raw materials, work in progress, semi-￿nished and ￿nished
goods, and goods for sale) to consider the e⁄ect on trade credit extended as inventories are
processed from raw material form to work in progress, semi-￿nished and ￿nished goods.
First, we ￿nd that the upstream inventory holding (relative to sales) has a negative
e⁄ect on accounts receivable (relative to sales) and the impact is stronger in the case of
processed inventories. As more work is done to the inputs, they are more dedicated to the
owner; inventories of specialised goods have fewer diversion opportunities at every stage of
production, therefore the seller has greater incentive to obtain sales, and trade credit provides
the inducement to the customer to purchase inventory.
Second, we examine the impact of the stage of fabrication of inventories on the trade
credit o⁄ered by di⁄erent size classes of ￿rms in sectors such as manufacturing, construction,
and retailing. Our results suggest a greater sensitivity of trade credit extended to processed
inventories compared to total inventories for smaller ￿rms than for larger ￿rms supporting
trade credit theories by Bougheas et al. (2009) and Daripa and Nilsen (2011).
Third, we ￿nd that ￿rms that purchase a higher proportion of di⁄erentiated inputs buy
more on credit from their suppliers i.e. they have more trade credit received than other ￿rms.
Also, the higher the proportion of service inputs relative to standardized inputs, the lower
the volume of trade credit taken. These are exactly the predictions of Fabbri and Menichini
(2010), consistent also with the collateral liquidation motive proposed by Longhofer and
Santos (2003), Frank and Maksimovic (2005), Cuæat (2007), and Giannetti et al. (2011).
We determine that ￿rms lose the advantage in collateral liquidation as the inventories are
3processed by their customers from raw material form to work in progress, semi-￿nished and
￿nished goods. The advantage we have over the original test employed by Petersen and
Rajan (1997), which used average data for the ￿rms in the same two-digit SIC category
from Compustat, is that we have the proportion of goods at four stages of fabrication at
the individual ￿rm-level in our inventory data. Nevertheless, we con￿rm the original results
reported by Petersen and Rajan. We also show that sectors that undertake little or no
transformation of the product - wholesale and retail for example - receive more trade credit
than other sectors, further con￿rming the argument we propose.
The following section presents brie￿ y the background literature that motivates our em-
pirical model for the extension of trade credit. Section 3 describes the data and summary
statistics. In section 4, we present our empirical model and the methodology used. Section
5 presents our empirical work and in the ￿nal section we conclude.
2 Related Literature
There has been a long running debate about the motives suppliers and customers face in
o⁄ering or receiving trade credit, many of which are summarized and then evaluated in
Peterson and Rajan (1997).1 We summarise below the three strands of this literature and
dwell in more detail on the papers more closely related to ours.
2.1 Specialised goods and trade credit
Recent work by Burkart and Ellingsen (2004), Cuæat (2007), and Fabbri and Menichini
(2010) stresses that the motives discussed by Petersen and Rajan are greatly in￿ uenced
by the nature of the transacted good. Burkart and Ellingsen (2004) and Giannetti et al.
(2011) note that the more standardized the product transacted the easier it is to divert its
use to other purposes, and the easier it is to ￿nd alternative suppliers, so customer-seller
relationships are weak and price discrimination through trade credit may be harder. As a
product becomes more specialized in nature it has fewer alternative uses and fewer suppliers,
which strengthens the relationship between customer and supplier that Petersen and Rajan
1A list of the most prominent theories includes information asymmetry (Smith, 1987), signalling (Biais
and Gollier, 1997), price discrimination arguments (Brennan et al., 1988), ￿nancial monitoring advantages
(Jain, 2000 and Mateut et al., 2006), product quality (Smith, 1997, Lee and Stove, 1993 and Long et al.,
1993), redeployment of goods after default (Frank and Maksimovic, 2005 and Wilner, 2000), opportunistic
behavior (Burkart and Ellingsen, 2004, Fabbri and Menichini, 2010) and inventory transactions costs (Ferris,
1981, Emery, 1987, Bougheas et al., 2009, Daripa and Nilsen, 2011).
4(1997) found to be important. Burkart and Ellingsen (2004) point out that the advantage of
trade credit lies in its illiquid nature, which is not easily diverted as cash inputs might be;
this explains why trade credit is limited to the value of the inputs o⁄ered to the customer.
Cuæat (2007) argues that there is another reason for trade credit to increase when a
￿rm uses a specialized product. Buyers and sellers enter symbiotic relationships in which
neither has the incentive to damage the trust that exists between them. First, when goods
are specialized, and sellers are di¢ cult to replace, credit enforcement is easier for suppliers
than for ￿nancial intermediaries. This is a formal statement of Petersen and Rajan￿ s view.
Second, suppliers o⁄er credit when banks will not, and insure against liquidity shocks. They
do this because trade credit is forward looking (based on future sales and business) while
bank lending is backward looking (based on collateral accumulated).2 This reinforces the
customer-seller relationship further and encourages greater trade credit where goods are
specialized. Finally, suppliers o⁄er signals of reassurance to other creditors, e.g. banks,
about the creditworthiness of their customers, and hence in equilibrium ￿rms obtain bank
and trade credit. In these circumstances, Cuæat (2007) predicts that trade credit volumes
increase where the transacted good is specialized.
Both Cuæat (2007) and Giannetti et al. (2011) use ￿rm-level data to examine the testable
predictions of their theories. Cuæat uses the Fame dataset of the United Kingdom as do
Mateut et al. (2006) and Bougheas et al. (2009). Giannetti et al. (2011) use the NSSBF data
of the United States following Elliehausen and Wolken (1993) and Petersen and Rajan (1997);
they also compare these results with those generated using Compustat data. Giannetti et
al. (2011) establish that manufacturing ￿rms that sell or buy di⁄erentiated goods use more
trade credit than do those with standardized goods, or those from other industrial sectors.
This is true for trade credit o⁄ered by sellers and trade credit received by buyers in separate
tests. Cuæat (2007) explores how trade credit as a proportion of total assets (or total debt)
varies with the length of the relationship built between customer and supplier (proxied by
age). This is because his model allows a ￿rm to specialize and build up a close relationship
with its supplier, and for trade credit to increase as a result, due to the specialized nature
of the transacted goods and services.
2In a similar vein, studying the 2007-2008 ￿nancial crisis, Garcia-Appendini and Motoriol-Garriga (2011)
show that ￿rms provide liquidity insurance to their clients when bank credit is scarce.
52.2 Inventories and trade credit
The literature by Ferris (1981), Emery (1987), Petersen and Rajan (1997), Longhofer and
Santos (2003), Frank and Maksimovic (2005), Bougheas et al. (2009), and Daripa and
Nilsen (2011) explores inventory transactions costs as a motive for o⁄ering trade credit. The
underlying argument suggests that suppliers may o⁄er trade credit as an incentive to buyers
to hold higher stocks of inventories - shifting inventory holding from seller to buyer - but
there are subtle di⁄erences between the theories proposed.
Bougheas et al. (2009) is based on a storage cost model, where the seller faces a stochastic
demand. Firms have an incentive to extend trade credit to their customers in order to
promote sales rather than accumulate costly inventories of ￿nished goods, which they hold
at a cost. This incentive is limited only by the need to obtain liquidity to meet their own
obligations, producers might readily o⁄er trade credit on appropriate terms to enhance sales
and boost demand. The model is driven by the capacity a ￿rm has to store ￿nished goods,
and this is disproportionately larger for bigger ￿rms compared with smaller ￿rms.
Daripa and Nilsen (2011) have a related but di⁄erent model. It is the downstream buyer
that faces the stochastic demand not the supplier. Two periods are necessary to produce
the ￿nal product as each production process (supplier input and ￿nal product) takes one
period. An unsatiss￿ed ￿nal consumer may return after one period but does not return after
two periods. In the face of demand uncertainty, the ￿nal good producer decides whether to
hold inventory to meet sales or to order supplies when ￿nal demand for goods arrives. The
decision is in￿ uenced by the cost of holding the inventory, which is not based on storage
costs, but on inventory ￿nancing costs faced by the downstream ￿rm, often through bank
loans. If upstream suppliers have better credit terms they can counter this by o⁄ering a
subsidy to their buyers in the form of trade credit, inducing the downstream ￿rms to hold
inventories.
2.3 Collateral liquidation and trade credit
The theory supported by Petersen and Rajan (1997), Longhofer and Santos (2003), and
Frank and Maksimovic (2005) refers to the collateral liquidation motive. A producer ￿rm
has advantages in selling a repossessed good when a customer fails to pay for it compared
to a bank that might seize the good as collateral in the face of non-payment of a loan. The
￿rm has an established sales network and can redirect the good to its other customers, while
6a bank has no such network. The lower transactions costs in repossession induce a seller
to o⁄er the goods on trade credit since they are easily redirected if the customer fails to
pay for them. This comparative advantage will be more pronounced for di⁄erentiated goods
because they are tailored to the needs of fewer customers, and it is harder to identify suitable
buyers and to obtain reference prices (Fabbri and Menichini, 2010). This should contribute
to shield suppliers of di⁄erentiated goods and services against buyer opportunism (Burkart
and Ellingsen, 2004) in the same way as strong relationships with customers do. Therefore
trade credit should be greater where suppliers can enforce payments more readily through
the threat of termination of the specialized supply, and buyers have less incentive to renege
on payments of trade credit where it is o⁄ered.
3 Data and summary statistics
3.1 Data Source
Our main data source is the pro￿t and loss account and balance sheet data gathered by
Bureau van Dijk in the Diane database, which provides a nationally representative sample
of ￿nancial information about French companies, including trade credit taken and o⁄ered.
The size of the dataset is considerably larger than other databases with a similar range of
￿nancial information used for the study of trade credit taken and o⁄ered. We include ￿rms
with more than three consecutive yearly observations and drop the 1 percent tails for each
of the regression variables to control for the potential in￿ uence of outliers. The ￿nal sample
includes information about over 82,000 French ￿rms observed between 4 to 8 consecutive
years. This gives us an unbalanced panel with about 583,429 ￿rm-year observations on
￿rms in di⁄erent economic sectors over the time period 2000-2007. This dataset is larger
than the 3,489 US ￿rms in the Giannetti et al. (2011) study based on the 1998 NSSBF
data, and larger than the 39,500 ￿rms Cuæat (2007) uses from the Bureau van Dijk Fame
database, covering manufacturing, retailers and wholesalers. We also have the advantage
of more detailed information on the types of inventories held by ￿rms which enables us to
consider the inventory stage of fabrication motive. The majority of the ￿rms included in the
dataset are not traded on the stock market and this means we are likely to observe a large
proportion of small and medium sized ￿rms.
The database provides detailed industry-speci￿c information that allows us to identify
the characteristics of the traded products. The largest single sector in our database is
7manufacturing, which comprises 24% of our total observations, and the remainder is made
up of construction (21%), retail (16%), wholesale (12%), and services (28%), which includes
tourism, ￿nancial services, real estate and others as recorded in Table 1. To test whether
trade credit extension is correlated with product characteristics, we separate manufacturing
￿rms producing di⁄erentiated goods from ￿rms producing standardized goods as in Giannetti
et al. (2011), following the classi￿cation of Rauch (1999). The data appendix gives the
assignment of the UK 2003 SIC codes to di⁄erentiated and standardized goods categories.
There are 89,603 observations for di⁄erentiated goods manufacturers and 52,190 observations
for standardized goods manufacturers.
<Table 1 about here>
The Diane database also has vital information allowing us to separate work in progress
and ￿nished goods and services from the total stock of inventories. This gives us a further
advantage in testing the inventory transactions cost model. We can separate inventories in
total into four sub-categories of inventories in the French accounting system. These are: a)
raw materials and consumables, which are the basic materials purchased from other ￿rms
to be used in the ￿rm￿ s production operations, b) work in progress, which are partially
￿nished goods requiring (important) additional work before they become ￿nished goods
(more than 50% of the production process remains to be completed), c) semi-￿nished and
￿nished goods, which require some minor additional work before they become goods for
sale (less than 50% of the production process remains to be done), and d) goods for sale,
which are goods on which the production has been totally completed but that are not yet
sold. From these categories we construct total inventories from items a) - d), and processed
inventories from items b) - d), which is the sum of work in progress, semi-￿nished and
￿nished goods, and goods for sale. As more work is done to the inputs they are more
dedicated to the owner and less easily re-sold when salvaged by the supplier, but in addition,
inventories of di⁄erentiated goods manufacturers have fewer diversion opportunities than
those of standardized manufacturers at every stage of production. This provides a more
detailed test of the impact of di⁄erentiation of goods on trade credit than the test that
separates ￿rms into industries.
3.2 Sample Descriptive Statistics
Table 2 reports the summary statistics for our sample of ￿rms separated into industrial
sectors giving mean values and standard errors in brackets. We report in the ￿rst column all
8manufacturing ￿rms, and in columns 2 and 3 the manufacturers separated into di⁄erentiated
goods producers and standardized goods producers. Columns 4 and 5 report results for
construction and retail sectors.3
< Tables 2A and 2B about here >
From Table 2A, we notice ￿rst of all the striking di⁄erence in the ratio of trade credit
extended to sales (TCextended) across sectors and across di⁄erentiated and standardized
goods categories.4 Manufacturing ￿rms producing di⁄erentiated goods sell on credit about 50
per cent more sales than manufacturing ￿rms producing standardized goods. Construction
￿rms sell a similar amount of goods on credit as di⁄erentiated manufacturers, while retailers
sell very little. By contrast, the uptake of trade credit (TCtaken) does not di⁄er much across
sectors, with ￿rms in all sectors taking up a similar proportion of trade credit in sales. It is
not unusual to observe similar trade credit received across sectors, since it depends on the
characteristics of the inputs used, i.e. the proportion of di⁄erentiated versus standardized
and service inputs. Firms producing di⁄erentiated goods extend three times more net trade
credit than ￿rms producing standardized goods, but they have very similar levels of net
trade credit (NetTC) to the construction sector. The retail sector has positive net trade
credit, indicating that unlike other sectors it receives much more trade credit than it o⁄ers -
our conjecture about the role of processed inventories is able to explain this result because
retailers do not process their inventories, and so they are o⁄ered more trade credit.5 Given
that the customers of the retail sector are mostly end consumers buying goods for cash or
using credit cards that clear balances relatively quickly (Petersen and Rajan, 1997), this
sector does not extend much trade credit.
We examine the bank loans and measures of inventory holdings in total and separated
into the categories raw materials only and inventories excluding raw materials (all scaled
by turnover) across sectors. The construction sector and the di⁄erentiated manufacturing
sector has a lower ratio of bank loans to turnover. Inventories, raw materials and inventories
3The sample period is 1999-2007 for manufacturing and construction ￿rms. Data for other service
providers is available only from 2000 onwards. Therefore, results presented separately for retail ￿rms and
for the whole sample in Tables 1, 3, 7 and 8 refer to the period 2000-2007.
4In line with Petersen and Rajan (1997, p. 667-668) and Giannetti et al. (2011, p. 16-17), we fully
recognise the simultaneous supply and demand issues in trade credit transactions in refering to accounts
payable and accounts receivable as trade credit taken/received. To address this, we control for a large
number of ￿rm-speci￿c characteristics and pick up systematic di⁄erences between sectors with industry
dummies, or intercepts in separate regressions for each industry.
5The summary statistics provide mean values for trade credit received over sales. Retailers have higher
sales than other sectors, and a similar ratio of trade credit received to sales. Therefore they have higher
trade credit received than other sectors.
9excluding raw materials show that the construction sector has lower inventories than other
sectors, and manufacturers of all types have very similar levels of total inventories and raw
materials. The retail sector has few raw materials, holding mostly ￿nished goods, consistent
with their activity as retailers of goods to end consumers.
The measures of scale such as real assets and real sales are reported in logarithms. Stan-
dardized goods manufacturers are larger on the basis of real assets and real sales compared to
di⁄erentiated goods manufacturers. Retailers appear smaller still in terms of real assets, but
their real sales are the largest in any sector. Construction ￿rms have the smallest real assets
and real sales. Retail ￿rms have been established for a longer period than manufacturing
￿rms and construction ￿rms (on average), but standard deviations within the sub-samples
are large suggesting that there are a mixture of older and younger ￿rms in each sector.
Other characteristics of the ￿rms reported are pro￿tability, measured as pro￿t over
turnover, and liquidity, measured as current assets minus inventories and trade credit of-
fered over turnover. The measure of risk takes ten values, representing deciles of the risk
distribution, with higher values indicating a higher likelihood of corporate failure in the next
12 months.6 We ￿nd that retailers and manufacturers of standardized goods have lower prof-
itability than other sectors, and the retail sector has a lower liquidity ratio at 0.09 compared
with other sectors in the range 0.123 - 0.130. Retail ￿rms have a higher risk measure on
average than ￿rms in manufacturing or construction, but the mean values for manufacturers
(di⁄erentiated and standardized) and construction ￿rms are more similar. The probability
of default implied by these average risk measures is between 10 and 20 percent for manufac-
turers and construction ￿rms, and between 20 and 30 percent for retailers.
Breakdown of the data into di⁄erent sizes by sector are reported in Table 2B. Firms are
considered to be large if their mean real assets are in the top quarter of the distribution
of average real assets for all ￿rms operating in the same industry group. Large ￿rms hold
on average 50% higher inventories relative to sales than do small ￿rms and this is even
more relevant when we look at the ratio of work in progress and ￿nished goods to sales,
supporting the ￿ndings of Bougheas et al. (2009). The test of equality of p-values reported
in the columns labeled ￿ di⁄￿demonstrate clearly that, with a few exceptions, the mean values
are signi￿cantly di⁄erent in each comparison, and this con￿rms our ￿ndings in unreported
tests of equality of means between di⁄erent sectors where ￿rm sizes are not distinguished.
6The details of the factors that contribute to the risk score and of the aggregation procedure are reported
in the data appendix.
104 Empirical speci￿cation and estimation
We explore our empirical speci￿cation for trade credit extended from the suppliers perspec-
tive, by initially estimating the equation in the following variables:
TCextendedit = ￿i + ￿1Inventoriesit + ￿2Xit + ￿3Differentiatedi + ￿4Servicesi +
+￿5 Retaili + ￿6Wholesalei + dt + uit (4.1)
where TCextendedit is trade credit extended scaled by sales. The stock of inventories
(Inventoriesit) measure the incentives ￿rms face to increase sales (and reduce inventories)
by o⁄ering trade credit.We have two variants of our model: the ￿rst has a measure based
on total inventories (Total_Invit) and a second version where we use processed inventories
(Proces_Invit). The former measures all inventories including raw materials, while the latter
excludes raw materials. We expect processed inventories to be more dedicated to the owner
than raw materials, and to create a greater incentive to obtain sales, through trade credit if
necessary.7
We control for ￿rm-speci￿c (￿i), time-invariant (dt), and sector speci￿c e⁄ects (Di⁄er-
entiatedi, Servicesi, Retaili, and Wholesalei). The omitted category is Standardizedi. The
sector speci￿c e⁄ects allow us to test for the in￿ uence of the type of good on the trade credit
extended. Xit is a vector of controls accounting for the supply side in￿ uences on trade credit
extended, including the amount of bank loans (BankLoansit), which controls for alternative
sources of ￿nance that might allow ￿rms to o⁄er trade credit while continuing production;
the measure of the likelihood of company failure in the near future (Riskit); Pro￿tsit given by
the ￿rm￿ s pro￿t (or loss) for the period; and Liquidityit de￿ned as ￿rm￿ s gross liquid assets
(cash, bank deposits, and other current assets excluding accounts receivable and stocks).
With the exception of Riskit,which is scale free, all variables are scaled by total sales. The
logarithm of the ￿rms￿book value of assets controls for size e⁄ects (Sizeit).
This model is estimated using the system generalized method of moments (SYS-GMM)
where we control for the possible endogeneity of the regressors by using lags of each of the
regressors as instruments. Time dummies are included in all our regressions and in the
7In a di⁄erent context, Caggese (2007), Tsoukalas (2011), and Wen (2011) use the stage of fabrication
of inventories to provide an analysis of input and output inventory dynamics in macroeconomic models.
These papers refer to raw materials and work in progress as input inventories, and ￿nished goods as output
inventories. We de￿ne processed inventories as those that have been worked, either by the seller or the
customer, and are therefore dedicated in some respects to the buyer. This is more consistent with the
concept of di⁄erentiated goods used in the trade credit literature that we address.
11instrument matrix. We report tests for serial correlation and the Hansen test for the legiti-
macy of variables dated t-2 and further as instruments in the di⁄erenced equation.8 We also
estimate the model using the Hausman-Taylor (HT) and the random e⁄ects (RE) estimator
to provide evidence of the robustness of the results to di⁄erent estimation methods.9
We then model the trade credit extended from the sellers￿perspective in more detail.
First, with the bene￿t of a much larger sample, we are able to estimate the trade credit
extended equation separately for manufacturers with di⁄erentiated and standardized goods,
and also for construction and retail sectors. We expect the use of trade credit to di⁄er across
industries because empirical studies have found wide variations across industries but rather
similar credit terms within industries (Ng et al., 1999; Nilsen, 2002), and the reliance of
￿rms on internal ￿nance relative to external ￿nance follows an industry pattern. We control
for ￿rm-speci￿c (￿i), time-invariant (dt), and industry-speci￿c e⁄ects (vjt).
TCextendedit = ￿i + ￿1Inventoriesit + ￿2Xit + dt + vjt + uit (4.2)
Second, we are able to estimate separately the response of small and large ￿rms in dif-
ferentiated and standardized manufacturing ￿rms, construction, and retail industries, where
the size of the ￿rm is determined relative to the industry. Firms are considered to be large if
their mean real assets are in the top quarter of the distribution of the average real assets for
all ￿rms operating in the same industry. Firms are not allowed to transit between categories.
It is important to control for di⁄erences in size because a ￿rm￿ s relationship with its bank
can di⁄er with its scale, and Daripa and Nilsen (2011) argue bank loans are used to ￿nance
inventories in the absence of a subsidy through trade credit. By controlling for size within
industry this also allows for the e⁄ect of scale and industry on the cost of holding inventories,
since inventory costs di⁄er signi￿cantly across industries (Fazel, 1997; Shirley and Winston,
8The serial correlation tests are asymptotically distributed as a standard normal under the null of no
serial correlation of the di⁄erenced residuals. Under the null of instrument validity, the Hansen test for over-
identifying restrictions is asymptotically distributed as a chi-square with degrees of freedom equal to the
number of instruments less the number of parameters. All GMM models are estimated using the xtabond2
estimator developed by Roodman (2009).
9We use the system and not the ￿rst di⁄erence GMM estimator as the latter cannot control for time invari-
ant sector speci￿c e⁄ects (Differentiatedi; Servicesi; Retaili and Wholesalei). Similarly, time invariant
sector e⁄ects cannot be accomodated in a ￿xed e⁄ects (FE) estimation. Therefore, to check robustness of
results to the choice of estimator we use the random e⁄ects (RE), which assumes that regressors are not
correlated with the individual ￿xed e⁄ects, and the Hausman-Taylor (HT) estimator, which allows some
regressors to be correlated with the individual ￿xed e⁄ects, but still does not allow for endogeneity of the
regressors.
122004), and therefore the incentive ￿rms face to generate sales by o⁄ering trade credit.10
Finally, we explain trade credit taken by estimating the following model:
TCtakenit = ￿i + ￿1Inventoriesit + ￿2Xit + ￿3Pdiffit + ￿4Pservit +
+￿5 Retaili + ￿6Wholesalei + dt + uit (4.3)
where the variables are similarly de￿ned as in the previous model, but TCtakenit is the
trade credit taken scaled by assets, Pdiffit is the proportion of di⁄erentiated goods inputs
used by the ￿rm, and Pservit the proportion of service inputs used by the ￿rm (de￿ned as
inputs from non-manufacturing industries over total inputs). Giannetti et al. (2011) argue
that ￿rms with a larger proportion of di⁄erentiated goods suppliers will take more trade
credit than ￿rms with more standardized goods suppliers, and similarly, those with more
services will receive more trade credit. Once again, this model is estimated using the system
generalized method of moments (SYS-GMM) which allows us to control for time-invariant
sector-speci￿c e⁄ects.11 In a variant of this model we add the variable PropProces_Invit
which measures the share of work in progress and ￿nished goods in total inventories. Firms
with a high proportion of goods that have been processed have relatively few goods to seize
in raw material form, and the collateral liquidation advantages to the supplier will diminish.
5 Empirical results
5.1 Trade credit extended
Our ￿rst empirical result is reported in Table 3, where we present our ￿ndings from the full
panel of data comprising 583,429 ￿rm-year observations of 82,082 French ￿rms in the period
2000 to 2007. We start our analysis with the determinants of the volume of trade credit from
the sellers￿perspective. Our variables in this model follow Giannetti et al. (2011) but we
also control for the sellers￿stocks of inventories. We report results estimated using system
GMM, the Hausman-Taylor (HT), and the random e⁄ects (RE) estimator.
10All these models are estimated with ￿rst di⁄erence GMM. Industry speci￿c time dummies are included in
all speci￿cations both as regressors and as instruments. Consistent with Bougheas et al. (2009) and Blundell
et al. (1992), we identify four main industries within the standardized sector and ￿ve main industries within
the di⁄erentiated sector. The data appendix describes the two-digit SIC codes included in each industry
group. Results using other estimators are comparable, and are available from the authors on request.
11Again we run robustness checks on the estimation method using the Hausman-Taylor (HT) and the
random e⁄ects (RE) estimator.
13< Table 3 about here >
We test for the e⁄ect of the characteristics of the transacted goods on trade credit in
Table 3. We ￿nd that ￿rms classi￿ed as di⁄erentiated (manufacturing) goods producers have
a positive and signi￿cant coe¢ cient on an intercept dummy variable, which contrasts with
a smaller positive and signi￿cant e⁄ect for service and wholesale ￿rms, and a negative and
signi￿cant e⁄ect for retailers. This can be interpreted as a demonstration of the lower moral
hazard associated with di⁄erentiated goods, where there are fewer alternative suppliers if a
buyer defaults on payment under the diversion theory; it is also consistent with the collateral
liquidation hypothesis, since di⁄erentiated goods are more di¢ cult to dispose of without a
seller network (Fabbri and Menichini, 2010).
We exploit the unique information in the Diane dataset which allows us to distinguish
among inventories according to their stage in the production process when we explore the
relationship between inventories and trade credit. We expect trade credit extended to be
in￿ uenced to a greater extent by goods that have been processed, that cannot be returned
to their supplier. To test this we aggregate the stock of work in progress, semi-￿nished and
￿nished goods, and goods for sale and scale it by sales for each ￿rm (Proces_Inv).
In column 1 of Table 3 we consider ￿rst the e⁄ect of all inventories, which we ￿nd has
a negative and signi￿cant e⁄ect on trade credit extended as expected. This is consistent
with Bougheas et al. (2009), where the cost of holding inventories incentivizes the ￿rm to
sell goods on trade credit. It is also consistent with Daripa and Nilsen (2011), according to
whom the seller subsidizes the shift of inventories to the buyer. We then notice in column
2 that processed inventories have a stronger relationship with the volume of trade credit
extended than total inventories. The coe¢ cient estimate indicates a one percent decrease
in inventories excluding raw materials is associated with a 0.76% increase in trade credit
extended (consistent with higher sales volume) which is greater than the coe¢ cient for total
inventories. Our argument is similar to the sales motive identi￿ed by Wilson and Summers
(2002), where ￿rms extend sales by o⁄ering goods on account in the ￿rst instance, and the
subsidy of inventory argument of Daripa and Nilsen (2011) but we make the link between
the stage of fabrication of inventories that other authors have not previously assessed.
We introduce a number of controls for ￿rm characteristics in our regressions for pro￿ts,
liquidity of the ￿rm, and bank loans, measured as ratios over total sales, and our risk measure
that gives an indication of default risk on a discrete scale (1-10). Pro￿ts in our results has
a negative and signi￿cant coe¢ cient, meaning higher pro￿ts reduce trade credit extended
14relative to sales. Trade credit provision is left to relatively unpro￿table ￿rms. Petersen and
Rajan (1997) suggest that ￿rms that are in trouble may use the extension of credit to attempt
to maintain their sales. Less liquid ￿rms in our sample extend more trade credit, which is
similar to the ￿nding of Petersen and Rajan (1997), who detect a negative relationship
between ￿rms￿liquidity and their volume of sales on credit.
Our estimates for trade credit extended for each sector separately are presented in Ta-
ble 4. We split the 19,445 manufacturing ￿rms into di⁄erentiated and standardized goods
manufacturers, and compare these ￿rms with 14,326 construction ￿rms and 12,207 retailers.
< Table 4 about here >
The most important result in this table is the relationship between trade credit extended
and inventories in total and once they have been processed. The negative relationship be-
tween trade credit extended and inventories (in columns 1-4) is stronger in the di⁄erentiated
manufacturing sector and the construction sector than for other sectors. The hypothesis that
the diversion theory should more strongly apply to inventories of goods with fewer alternative
uses or buyers is con￿rmed. Also, the coe¢ cient on processed inventories (in columns 5-8)
is larger in absolute value than the coe¢ cient on total inventories (in columns 1-4) for all
sectors. This o⁄ers support for our conjecture that partly processed or fully ￿nished goods
are more di⁄erentiated and less divertible than the raw material inputs, and for these types
of goods the manufacturer has a stronger incentive to generate sales by o⁄ering trade credit.
As far as we are aware there is no previous work that has tested this hypothesis.
The breakdown of the sample into these sectoral sub-samples, allowing for the type of
goods, does not make major changes to the results for other controls reported in Table 3,
however, ￿rm size has greater in￿ uence on trade credit extended than before for manufactur-
ers of di⁄erentiated goods, and construction ￿rms. We also ￿nd that access to bank ￿nance
plays a more important role in the decision to extend trade credit for ￿rms producing di⁄er-
entiated goods. Di⁄erentiated goods have a lower collateral value and therefore bank lending
in the di⁄erentiated sector is lower than in the standardized goods sector. This result is in
line with the summary statistics and supports the diversion value hypothesis in Giannetti
et al. (2011). As ￿rms in the di⁄erentiated sector are more constrained in their access to
external funding, a unit increase in their bank loans leads to a marginally larger impact
on their volume of trade credit extended relative to sales than in the case of ￿rms in the
standardized sector.
155.1.1 Supplier size
Given that the results in Table 4 seemed to show size matters for ￿rms in di⁄erent sectors,
we now estimate the trade credit extended equation for small and large ￿rms in di⁄erent
industries, using the 75 percentile of the real asset distribution as the cuto⁄ point. Using
a cuto⁄ of 66 percent instead produces similar results. The separation into small and large
￿rms relative to the industry allows for the fact that there are substantial di⁄erences in
access to ￿nance (Ng et al., 1999; Nilsen, 2002) and inventory costs (Fazel, 1997; Shirley and
Winston, 2004) across industries. In particular, by splitting ￿rms into size categories we are
able to test whether smaller ￿rms with higher inventory holding costs, following Bougheas
et al. (2009), and therefore with more incentive to persuade customers to hold inventories,
as explained in Daripa and Nilsen (2011), o⁄er more trade credit than ￿rms that are larger.
We further suggest that once goods have been processed they are more dedicated to the ￿rm
and therefore the ￿rms that already have incentives to induce sales with trade credit should
face greater incentives if a greater proportion of their inventories are processed.
< Tables 5A and 5B about here >
Tables 5A and 5B consider size categories within each industrial sector and make al-
lowance for di⁄erentiated and standardized goods manufacturers separately. The trade credit
extension of small ￿rms displays a greater sensitivity to total inventories in Table 5A and to
processed inventories in Table 5B. This con￿rms that smaller ￿rms have a stronger inventory
transactions cost motive for o⁄ering trade credit compared to larger ￿rms for all industries
not just manufacturing, consistent with Bougheas et al. (2009).
We ￿nd that there is greater sensitivity to bank loans for smaller ￿rms in di⁄erentiated
and standardized manufacturing, construction and retail sectors compared to sensitivity to
bank loans for larger ￿rms. Berger et al. (2005) document that di⁄erences in ￿rm size (and
accounting records) a⁄ect the nature of the bank-￿rm relationship and the availability of
bank credit. Therefore small ￿rms are typically more likely to be credit constrained than
larger ￿rms. In line with Bougheas et al. (2009) and Petersen and Rajan (1997), we ￿nd
that ￿rms with better access to credit o⁄er more trade credit. This could mean, at the
margin, that access to bank loans would allow ￿nancially constrained smaller ￿rms to o⁄er
trade credit and continue to ￿nance production, while larger ￿rms would be less likely to
face a constraint.
In all our speci￿cations, we include industry speci￿c time dummies to control for in-
16dustry characteristics, and the resulting models satisfy the conditions required in GMM of
non-rejection of the hypothesis ￿ no serial correlation in the errors￿and non-rejection of the
Hansen test with only a few exceptions. In unreported speci￿cations, we replace the industry
dummies with an industry concentration index as in Giannetti et al. (2011), but the industry
concentration variable does not perform well, although all our results remain intact. We also
control for the age of the ￿rm, which does not change our results, and similar to Giannetti et
al. (2011), we ￿nd that ￿rm age does not have a consistent impact on trade credit extension.
The empirical results reported in Tables 3 through 5 con￿rm the new prediction in our
paper that processed inventories have a larger impact on trade credit than total inventories.
Once work is done to the inputs they are more dedicated to the owner, and cannot be
returned to the seller: there is no going back, which creates stronger incentives for sellers to
o⁄er trade credit.
5.2 Trade credit taken
We turn now attention to trade credit taken by ￿rms. In order to link trade credit taken with
the characteristics of the traded products we need to identify the nature of the various inputs
the ￿rms purchase. We construct the variables Pdiffit (the proportion of di⁄erentiated
goods inputs used by the ￿rm) and Pservit (the proportion of service inputs from non-
manufacturing industries over total inputs) to consider the e⁄ect of the type of goods used
on trade credit taken. The information is derived from the input-output tables from INSEAD.
As these variables do not vary much (if at all) over time and we want to include also dummies
for ￿rms in retail and wholesale, we use again the SYS-GMM estimator.
< Table 6 about here>
The results in Table 6 are reported for all 81,287 ￿rms that are split into 61,160 small
￿rms and 20,127 large ￿rms using a 75% cuto⁄ in the real asset distribution. The results
con￿rm that ￿rms that purchase a higher proportion of di⁄erentiated inputs buy more on
credit from their suppliers. On the contrary, a higher proportion of service inputs relative to
standardized inputs lowers the volume of trade credit taken. These results are consistent with
the lower moral hazard associated with di⁄erentiated goods, as mentioned in the previous
section, where there are fewer alternative suppliers if a buyer defaults on payment, and
support the ￿ndings of Giannetti et al. (2011) and Daripa and Nilsen (2011). Our results
are also consistent with the collateral liquidation hypothesis due to Longhofer and Santos
(2003), Frank and Maksimovic (2005), Cuæat (2007) and Fabbri and Menichini (2010), as
17di⁄erentiated products are worth more in the hands of their suppliers. This advantage is
absent in the case of service suppliers as services have no liquidation value.12
<Table 7 about here>
In Table 7 we investigate the advantages of collateral liquidation. Petersen and Rajan
(1997) argue that as inventories become more specialized they are more di¢ cult to dispose
of, making it less likely that a seller will have a strong advantage over any other creditor in
the disposal of repossessed goods. They are able to approximate this e⁄ect using a measure
of liquidation costs, de￿ned as the share of ￿nished goods in the total inventory averaged
across ￿rms in the same two-digit SIC category. Here we have much greater detail on the
nature of inventory, and we record this for each ￿rm in our dataset. Therefore we construct a
similar liquidation cost variable based on the share of work in progress plus ￿nished goods to
total inventories for each ￿rm and re-evaluate the results reported in Table 6. We expect to
￿nd that the larger the ratio the greater the liquidation costs for the supplier if they should
repossess the goods o⁄ered on trade credit, and indeed as liquidation costs increase (due to
the larger proportion of processed inventories in the form of work in progress, semi-￿nished
and ￿nished goods) so the trade credit taken falls in our results. This con￿rms the ￿nding
of Petersen and Rajan in our data, since there is a consistent and signi￿cantly negative
coe¢ cient irrespective of the estimation method used, but it also tells us that the impact of
these liquidation costs are larger for bigger ￿rms. A weakened collateral liquidation motive
reduces the incentives to the seller to o⁄er trade credit, and it works in the opposite direction
to the diversion hypothesis.
In both Tables 6 and 7 we ￿nd that retail and wholesale ￿rms take more trade credit
than other sectors as indicated by the positive and signi￿cant coe¢ cient on the dummy
12The legal system could prevent the supplier from seizing particular goods, and therefore, limit the
liquidation motive for trade credit. For example, the U.S. laws allow suppliers to repossess the good only
within 10 days from delivery, unless they establish a lien, which is a costly and infrequent practice. However,
the EU Directive 2011 (replacing EU Directive 2000/35/EC), which regulates all commercial transactions in
France and aims to improve the functioning of the EU internal market, recommends that "Member States
shall provide in conformity with the applicable national provisions designated by private international law
that the seller retains title to goods until they are fully paid for if a retention of title clause has been expressly
agreed between the buyer and the seller before the delivery of the goods." There is no time limitation on
repossession. In the extreme case that the buyer cannot meet its ￿nancial obligations, it may ￿le for
bankruptcy. The pro-debtor French bankruptcy law was explicitly intended to save bankrupt ￿rms in order
to protect employment and reduce domino e⁄ects on suppliers or trade creditors, who are often junior or
unsecured claimants and face ￿nancial distress following the bankruptcy of their clients. But the reform
implemented in 2006 aimed to render bankruptcy more creditor friendly, and the 2009 law stipulates that
the ownership of property may be held as collateral by the e⁄ect of a retention of title clause which suspends
the e⁄ect of a conveyance contract until full payment of the obligation which is its counterpart. This makes
French law more supportive of creditors in bankruptcy than it once was.
18variable indicating the ￿rm belongs to one of these sectors. This provides con￿rmation of
our conjecture that processed inventories diminish the advantages from collateral liquidation,
because goods sold by upstream ￿rms (mainly manufacturers) to retailers and wholesalers are
not processed, they are stored and sold to their end consumers. Hence, the suppliers retain
their comparative advantage in repossessing their goods if retailers/wholesalers do not pay
on time. According to our hypothesis this explains why suppliers have a stronger incentive
to extend trade credit to wholesalers and retailers than to other ￿rms which transform the
goods. Previous theories discussed above do not o⁄er a reason for this ￿nding in their results.
6 Conclusions
This paper proposes that the processing of inventories alters the incentives for ￿rms to o⁄er
and receive trade credit. Once a product has been processed we argue it is more dedicated to
the owner, creating a greater incentive for the goods to be sold - on trade credit if necessary.
There is no going back to suppliers further upstream. The same argument makes it less
attractive for suppliers to o⁄er trade credit to ￿rms since collateral cannot be liquidated
so easily. We explore this proposition in the context of the recent trade credit literature,
which discusses the motives for o⁄ering trade credit based on the nature of the good and the
inventory management motive.
Using a panel dataset of about 82,000 French ￿rms in several economic sectors, we are
able to show that as more work is done to the inputs they are more dedicated to the owner;
inventories of di⁄erentiated goods manufacturers have fewer diversion opportunities than
those of standardized manufacturers at every stage of production, and that the seller does
have greater incentive to obtain sales by using trade credit as an inducement to the customer
to purchase the goods. We also ￿nd that trade credit extended shows greater sensitivity to
processed inventories compared to total inventories, and that this e⁄ect is more powerful
for smaller ￿rms compared to larger ￿rms in a range of di⁄erent industries. Finally, when
examining trade credit received we ￿nd that ￿rms that have a higher proportion of processed
inventories receive less trade credit, since the seller loses the collateral liquidation advantages
as goods are processed. Wholesale and retail sectors, which undertake little or no transfor-
mation of the product, receive more trade credit than other sectors that process their inputs,
further con￿rming the argument we propose.
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Data Appendix
De￿nition of variables
TCextended= trade credit extended; balance sheet variable account receivables scaled by
￿rm turnover
TCtaken = trade credit taken; balance sheet variable creditors scaled by ￿rm turnover
NetTC = net trade credit; it is trade credit taken (TCtaken) minus trade credit extended
(TCextended)
BankLoans = bank borrowings scaled by turnover
Total_Inv = total inventories scaled by turnover
There are four types of inventories in the French accounting system:
1. raw materials and consumables = the basic materials purchased from other ￿rms to
be used in the ￿rm￿ s production operations,
2. work in progress = low partially ￿nished goods requiring (important) additional work
before they become ￿nished goods (more than 50% of the production process remains to do),
3. semi-￿nished and ￿nished goods= high partially ￿nished goods requiring (weak)
additional work before they become goods for sale (less than 50% of the production process
remains to do)
4. goods for sale= goods on which the production has been totally completed but that
are not yet sold.
Proces_Inv = the sum of work in progress, semi-￿nished and ￿nished goods, and goods
for sale scaled by turnover
Pro￿ts = pro￿t/loss for the period scaled by turnover
Liquidity = liquid assets (current assets minus inventories and accounts receivable) scaled
by turnover
Risk = measures the probability that the ￿rm will be in default in the near future. It
takes 10 values (1-10), with higher values indicating higher risk. It is based on the Financial
Score Conan-Holder (NPC) calculated as: NPC = 24*R1+22*R2+16*R3-84*R4-10*R5,
22where
R1=operating cash ￿ ow excluding extraordinary items, interest, dividends and royalties
/ total debt
R2=long-term capital (equity + long-term debt) / balance sheet total assets
R3=[current realizable assets + cash] / balance sheet total assets
R4=interest expenses / net turnover
R5=personnel expenses / added value
Risk = 10 if NPC < -4, i.e. a 90% probability of default in a near future,
= 9 if -4 <= NPC < 0, i.e. there is 80% probability of default in a near future,
= 8 if 0 <= NPC < 2, i.e. there is 70% probability of default in a near future,
= 7 if 2 <= NPC < 5, i.e. there is 60% probability of default in a near future,
= 6 if 5 <= NPC < 6, i.e. there is 50% probability of default in a near future,
= 5 if 6 <= NPC < 8, i.e. there is 40% probability of default in a near future,
= 4 if 8 <= NPC < 10, i.e. there is 30% probability of default in a near future,
= 3 if 10 <= NPC < 13, i.e. there is 20% probability of default in a near future,
= 2 if 13 <= NPC < 16, i.e. there is 10% probability of default in a near future,
= 1 if NPC >= 16.
Our results are robust to using a less detailed de￿nition of the variable risk.
Risk2 = 5 if NPC <-5,
= 4 if -5 <= NPC < 4,
= 3 if 4 <= NPC < 10,
= 2 if 10 <= NPC < 16,S
= 1 if NPC >= 16.
Size = logarithm of real total assets
Age = number of years since the ￿rm was established
Di⁄erentiated = 1 if the manufacturing ￿rm produces di⁄erentiated goods, 0 otherwise.
See Sector classi￿cation of ￿rms.
Standardized = 1 if the manufacturing ￿rm produces standardized goods, 0 otherwise.
See Sector classi￿cation of ￿rms.
Services = 1 for non-manufacturing ￿rms excluding Retail and Wholesale, 0 otherwise.
Retail = 1 for a retail ￿rm, SIC code 50 and 52, 0 otherwise.
Wholesale = 1 for a wholesale ￿rm, SIC code 51, 0 otherwise.
Pdi⁄ = proportion of di⁄erentiated inputs in total inputs used by ￿rms in the same
industry. Values calculated using data from the input-output tables with 117 entries available
from INSEAD.
Pserv = proportion of service inputs in total inputs used by ￿rms in the same industry.
Values calculated using data from the input-output tables with 117 entries available from
INSEAD.
PropProces_Inv = proportion of processed inventories (work in progress, semi ￿nished
and ￿nished goods) in total inventories.
23Sector classi￿cation of ￿rms
The classi￿cation of the manufacturers as di⁄erentiated or standardized is based on Rauch
(1999). All other industries are classi￿ed as services.
UK SIC 2003 Manufacturing Di⁄ Industry
15 Food products and beverages 0 S1
16 Tobacco products 0 S1
17 Textiles 0 S2
18 Wearing apparel; dressing and dyeing of fur 0 S2
19 Tanning and dressing of leather; luggage, 0 S2
handbags, saddlery harness and footwear
20 Wood and products of wood and cork, 0 S3
except furniture; articles of straw and plaiting materials
21 Pulp, paper and paper products; publishing and printing 0 S3
22 Publishing, printing and reproduction of recorded media 1 D1
23 Coke, re￿ned petroleum products and nuclear fuel 0 S4
24 Chemicals and chemical products 0 S4
25 Rubber and plastic products 1 D2
26 Other non-metallic mineral products 0 S4
27 Basic metals 0 S4
28 Fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment 1 D3
29 Machinery and equipment not elsewhere classi￿ed 1 D4
30 O¢ ce machinery and computers 1 D4
31 Electrical machinery and apparatus not elsewhere classi￿ed 1 D4
32 Radio, television and communication equipment and apparatus 1 D4
33 Medical, precision and optical instruments, watches and clocks 1 D4
34 Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 1 D5
35 Other transport equipment 1 D5
36 Furniture, manufacturing not elsewhere classi￿ed 1 D1
We distinguish four industry groups within the standardized sector (S1 to S4) and ￿ve
industry groups within the di⁄erentiated sector (D1 to D5) in line with Bougheas, et al.
(2009) and Blundell, et al. (1992). The last column of the table assigns the UK SIC 2003
codes to the nine industry groups. As we believe ￿rm size is industry speci￿c, we classify
￿rms as large if their mean real assets are in the top third of the distribution of average real
assets for all ￿rms operating in the same industry group. For instance, ￿rms operating in
industry group S1 (food products and beverages, and tobacco products) are considered large
if their average real assets over the sample period are in the top third of the distribution of
mean real assets of all ￿rms operating in industry group S1. Firms do not change their size
category over time. For a similar approach see Brown et al. (2009).
24Table 1. Sector composition
Industry Freq. Percent Cum.
Differentiated Manufacturers 89,603 15.36 15.36
Standardized Manufacturers 52,190 8.95 24.30
Construction 121,609 20.84 45.15
Retail 93,994 16.11 61.26
Wholesale 70,516 12.09 73.34
Hotels 43,836 7.51 80.86
Finance 46,087 7.90 88.76
Real estate & others 65,594 11.24 100.00
Total 583,429 100.00
Notes: The table gives the sector composition of our data. Firms are grouped into sectors on the basis of their
SIC 2003 code. The period covered is 2000-2007. Manufacturing firms are divided into differentiated and
standardized. See the data appendix for details.Table 2A. Summary statistics - industrial sector
Variable Manufacturing Differentiated Standardized Construction Retail
Trade credit extended 0.212 0.241 0.162 0.233 0.047
(0.107) (0.098) (0.103) (0.100) (0.063)
Trade credit received 0.141 0.148 0.128 0.139 0.116
(0.070) (0.068) (0.072) (0.064) (0.070)
Net trade credit (NetTC) -0.071 -0.093 -0.034 -0.094 0.069
(0.105) (0.105) (0.095) (0.090) (0.080)
Total_Inv 0.097 0.098 0.095 0.048 0.124
(0.079) (0.078) (0.082) (0.055) (0.088)
Raw materials 0.045 0.045 0.045 0.019 0.001
(0.046) (0.046) (0.047) (0.023) (0.005)
Proces_Inv 0.052 0.053 0.050 0.029 0.123
(0.059) (0.059) (0.059) (0.049) (0.088)
BankLoans 0.062 0.057 0.071 0.036 0.062
(0.082) (0.075) (0.093) (0.045) (0.083)
Risk 2.270 2.234 2.332 2.005 3.410
(1.976) (1.936) (2.041) (1.469) (2.537)
Profits 0.031 0.033 0.028 0.036 0.021
(0.045) (0.045) (0.044) (0.033) (0.029)
Liquidity 0.127 0.130 0.123 0.126 0.090
(0.117) (0.117) (0.115) (0.101) (0.080)
Assets (ln) 2.881 2.823 2.981 2.092 2.646
(1.283) (1.187) (1.429) (0.891) (1.002)
Sales (ln) 3.459 3.375 3.604 2.853 3.693
(1.212) (1.109) (1.359) (0.800) (1.080)
Age 21.338 20.848 22.186 17.023 32.555
(15.806) (15.392) (16.462) (11.688) (11.632)


















Trade credit 0.237 0.248 0.000 0.150 0.185 0.000 0.213 0.271 0.000 0.045 0.054 0.000
extended (0.098) (0.097) (0.105) (0.093) (0.095) (0.097) (0.060) (0.069)
Trade credit 0.138 0.168 0.000 0.118 0.148 0.000 0.122 0.170 0.000 0.112 0.129 0.000
received (0.066) (0.069) (0.071) (0.068) (0.056) (0.067) (0.068) (0.075)
Net trade -0.100 -0.080 0.000 -0.032 -0.037 0.000 -0.091 -0.101 0.000 0.067 0.075 0.000
credit (0.105) (0.103) (0.095) (0.095) (0.088) (0.093) (0.079) (0.084)
Total_Inv 0.083 0.127 0.000 0.084 0.117 0.000 0.047 0.050 0.000 0.121 0.133 0.000
(0.072) (0.081) (0.079) (0.084) (0.051) (0.062) (0.089) (0.083)
Raw materials 0.040 0.055 0.000 0.042 0.052 0.000 0.020 0.016 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000
(0.044) (0.048) (0.047) (0.047) (0.024) (0.021) (0.006) (0.004)
Proces_Inv 0.044 0.072 0.000 0.042 0.066 0.000 0.027 0.034 0.000 0.120 0.132 0.000
(0.053) (0.063) (0.055) (0.062) (0.044) (0.058) (0.089) (0.083)
BankLoans 0.056 0.058 0.0008 0.074 0.066 0.000 0.038 0.032 0.000 0.059 0.071 0.000
(0.074) (0.077) (0.095) (0.087) (0.046) (0.044) (0.078) (0.095)
Risk 2.276 2.153 0.000 2.408 2.183 0.000 2.022 1.972 0.000 3.473 3.221 0.000
(1.979) (1.847) (2.105) (1.901) (1.500) (1.406) (2.584) (2.381)
Profits 0.033 0.033 0.0717 0.030 0.024 0.000 0.036 0.037 0.000 0.021 0.022 0.000
(0.044) (0.046) (0.043) (0.044) (0.033) (0.033) (0.029) (0.029)
Liquidity 0.125 0.139 0.000 0.123 0.121 0.0491 0.116 0.147 0.000 0.088 0.098 0.000
(0.112) (0.127) (0.111) (0.123) (0.092) (0.112) (0.078) (0.087)
Assets (ln) 2.159 4.113 0.000 2.178 4.541 0.000 1.606 3.034 0.000 2.273 3.768 0.000
(0.624) (0.932) (0.842) (0.973) (0.544) (0.645) (0.764) (0.770)
Sales (ln) 2.770 4.552 0.000 2.840 5.088 0.000 2.428 3.678 0.000 3.365 4.679 0.000
(0.591) (0.919) (0.795) (0.932) (0.489) (0.622) (0.908) (0.946)
Age 18.404 25.597 0.000 19.467 27.470 0.000 15.161 20.639 0.000 31.752 34.966 0.000
(13.308) (17.861) (14.419) (18.744) (10.719) (12.609) (11.310) (12.240)
Observations 63973 32916 37060 19064 73375 37779 64884 21590Notes: The table reports means and standard deviations in parantheses. The sample period is 1999-2007 with the exception of firms in retail observed only from 2000
onwards. Trade credit extended and trade credit taken represent the balance sheet items account receivables and account payables, respectively, divided by the volume of
sales. Net trade credit is the difference between trade credit taken and extended. Total_Inv stands for total inventories; Raw materials are inventories of raw materials only
and Proces_Inv are inventories of work in progress and finished goods inventories. BankLoans represents short-term bank loans; Risk measures the likelihood of company
failure, where a higher value indicates that the firm is more risky. Profits gives the firm's profit (or loss) for the period; Liquidity represents firm's liquid assets (cash, bank
deposits, and other current assets). With the exception of Risk all other variables are scaled by total sales. Assets and Sales are the logarithm of firms real assets and sales,
respectively. Age gives the number of years since the firm was extablished.
In Table 2A firms are separated according to the characteristics of their goods. Column 1 reports statistics for all manufacturing firms while columns 2 and 3 separate
manufacturing firms into two sectors, differentiated and standardized.
In Table 2B firms are divided into two size categories within each sector. Firms are considered to be large if their mean real assets are in the top quarter of the distribution
of the average real assets for all firms operating in the same sector and industry. Firms are not allowed to transit between categories. The column titled Diff reports the p-
value of the t-test for the equality of means for small and large firms within each sector. See data appendix for more details.Table 3. Trade credit extended – whole panel








Total_Inv -0.517** -0.054*** -0.056***
(0.245) (0.003) (0.002)
Proces_Inv -0.758*** -0.078*** -0.075***
(0.263) (0.003) (0.003)
BankLoans -0.030 -0.031 0.027*** 0.027*** 0.018*** 0.019***
(0.024) (0.024) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Risk -0.009*** -0.008** -0.000*** -0.000** -0.001*** -0.001***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Profits -0.881*** -0.738*** 0.026*** 0.026*** 0.032*** 0.033***
(0.186) (0.183) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Liquidity -0.339*** -0.324*** -0.174*** -0.174*** -0.158*** -0.158***
(0.057) (0.062) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Size -0.009 -0.003 0.051*** 0.051*** 0.039*** 0.039***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Differentiated 0.092*** 0.093*** 0.089*** 0.089*** 0.089*** 0.089***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Services 0.017 0.027*** 0.074*** 0.075*** 0.066*** 0.067***
(0.013) (0.007) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Retail -0.102*** -0.065*** -0.099*** -0.095*** -0.099*** -0.096***
(0.007) (0.018) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Wholesale 0.025*** 0.054*** 0.008*** 0.011*** 0.013*** 0.016***
(0.004) (0.013) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Observations 583429 583429 583429 583429 583429 583429
Nr of id 82082 82082 82082 82082 82082 82082
m1 (p) 0.00 0.00
m5 (p) 0.10 0.11
Hansen (p) 0.00 0.11
R-squared 0.25 0.10
Notes: The table reports coefficients and standard deviations in parantheses. The sample period is 2000-2007.
The dependent variable is trade credit extended scaled by sales. Total_Inv stands for all inventories; Proces_Inv
are work in progress and finished goods inventories; BankLoans represents short-term bank loans; Profits gives
the firm's profit (or loss) for the period; Liquidity represents firm's liquid assets (cash, bank deposits, and other
current assets). All these variables are scaled by sales. Risk measures the likelihood of company failure, where a
higher value indicates that the firm is more risky.Size is the logarithm of real assets. Differentiated
(manufacturers), Services, Retail, and Wholesale are dummies taking value 1 for firms in the respective sectors.
The omitted category is Standardized (manufacturers). The same model is estimated with the system GMM
(columns 1 and 2), Hausman-Taylor (columns 3 and 4), and the random effects estimator (columns 5 and 6). The
table also reports the p-value for the Hansen test, for first-order (m1), and fifth-order (m5) serial correlation. The
R-squared is reported in columns 5 and 6. See Notes to Table 2 and data appendix for more details. *, **, ***
denote significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent level.Table 4. Trade credit extended - GMM results for diversion theory
Dependent variable: Differentiated Standardized Construction Retail Differentiated Standardized Construction Retail
TCextended (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Total_Inv -0.611*** -0.291** -0.656*** -0.221**
(0.132) (0.116) (0.158) (0.093)
Proces_Inv -0.899*** -0.393*** -0.676*** -0.229**
(0.147) (0.129) (0.154) (0.094)
BankLoans 0.101*** 0.019 0.112** 0.039*** 0.094*** 0.021 0.107** 0.040***
(0.019) (0.015) (0.048) (0.015) (0.020) (0.015) (0.048) (0.015)
Risk -0.009*** -0.007*** -0.000 0.001 -0.008*** -0.007*** -0.002 0.001
(0.002) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001)
Profits -0.512*** -0.274*** -0.072 -0.132 -0.486*** -0.246*** -0.070 -0.136
(0.071) (0.073) (0.146) (0.105) (0.068) (0.069) (0.147) (0.105)
Liquidity -0.247*** -0.221*** -0.354*** -0.014 -0.247*** -0.216*** -0.354*** -0.014
(0.031) (0.041) (0.051) (0.05) (0.030) (0.040) (0.051) (0.050)
Size 0.025*** 0.024* 0.033*** 0.001 0.027*** 0.021 0.034*** 0.008
(0.010) (0.013) (0.010) (0.007) (0.010) (0.013) (0.010) (0.007)
Observations 84679 48889 96828 74267 84679 48889 96828 74267
Number of firms 12210 7235 14326 12207 12210 7235 14326 12207
m1 (p) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
m (p) 0.12 0.22 0.04 0.12 0.20 0.17 0.05 0.13
Hansen (p) 0.03 0.08 0.12 0.31 0.09 0.05 0.05 0.22
Notes: The table reports coefficients and standard deviations in parantheses. The sample period is 1999-2007 except for retail which covers 2000-2007. The dependent variable is the
ratio of trade credit extended to sales. Total_Inv, Proces_Inv, BankLoans, Profits, and Liquidity are scaled by sales. Risk is a scale free measure of the likelihood of company failure.
Size is the logarithm of real assets. The table also reports the p-value for the Hansen test, for first-order (m1) and second-order (m2) serial correlation. Columns 3 and 7 report the m3
and columns 4 and 8 the m4 test for serial correlation instead of the m2. See Notes to Table 2 and the data appendix for more details. *, **, *** denote significance at 10, 5 and 1

















TCextended (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Total_Inv -0.503*** -0.128 -0.276* 0.053 -1.193*** -0.445*** -0.191*** -0.002
(0.131) (0.170) (0.147) (0.131) (0.163) (0.156) (0.057) (0.120)
BankLoans 0.144*** 0.019 0.051*** 0.012 0.152*** 0.179* 0.055*** 0.025
(0.022) (0.043) (0.016) (0.038) (0.037) (0.103) (0.011) (0.018)
Risk -0.008*** -0.003 -0.006*** -0.002 -0.002 0.006 -0.001* -0.002
(0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.007) (0.001) (0.001)
Profits -0.419*** -0.058 -0.201** -0.167 -0.057 -0.435 -0.174*** -0.223*
(0.076) (0.153) (0.078) (0.124) (0.114) (0.268) (0.055) (0.128)
Liquidity -0.241*** -0.153*** -0.170*** -0.188*** -0.345*** -0.304*** -0.011 -0.101*
(0.037) (0.049) (0.045) (0.054) (0.056) (0.078) (0.028) (0.059)
Size -0.014 0.067*** -0.006 0.051** 0.017* 0.072*** -0.014*** -0.021*
(0.009) (0.025) (0.014) (0.020) (0.009) (0.023) (0.004) (0.011)
Observations 63545 21134 36686 12203 72562 24266 55734 18533
Number of firms 9139 3071 5422 1813 10826 3500 9150 3057
m1 (p) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
m2 (p) 0.66 0.82 0.46 0.14 0.02 0.11 0.09 0.05
Hansen (p) 0.05 0.46 0.12 0.22 0.23 0.70 0.08 0.43
Notes: The table reports coefficients and standard deviations in parantheses. The sample period is 1999-2007 except for retail which covers 2000-2007. The dependent variable is the
ratio of trade credit extended to sales. Total_Inv, BankLoans, Profits, and Liquidity are scaled by sales. Risk is a scale free measure of the likelihood of company failure. Size is the
logarithm of real assets. Firms are considered to be large if their mean real assets are in the top quarter of the distribution of the average real assets for all firms operating in the same
sector and industry. Firms are not allowed to transit between categories. The table also reports the p-value for the Hansen test, for first-order (m1) and second-order (m2) serial
correlation. Columns 3, 4, and 6 report the m3 test for serial correlation instead of the m2. See Notes to Table 2 and the data appendix for more details. *, **, *** denote significance



















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Proces_Inv -0.854*** -0.596*** -0.290** -0.039 -1.283*** -0.489*** -0.199*** 0.013
(0.165) (0.191) (0.145) (0.161) (0.165) (0.148) (0.058) (0.123)
BankLoans 0.134*** 0.061* 0.047*** 0.013 0.139*** 0.182* 0.056*** 0.024
(0.022) (0.036) (0.015) (0.038) (0.036) (0.103) (0.011) (0.018)
Risk -0.007*** -0.009*** -0.007*** -0.001 -0.004 0.005 -0.001* -0.002
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.007) (0.001) (0.001)
Profits -0.402*** -0.586*** -0.180** -0.139 -0.018 -0.450* -0.177*** -0.220*
(0.076) (0.153) (0.073) (0.120) (0.113) (0.272) (0.055) (0.128)
Liquidity -0.241*** -0.170*** -0.165*** -0.180*** -0.371*** -0.292*** -0.011 -0.100*
(0.038) (0.043) (0.044) (0.054) (0.056) (0.078) (0.028) (0.059)
Size -0.010 0.045* -0.004 0.057*** 0.025*** 0.071*** -0.014*** -0.021*
(0.009) (0.025) (0.013) (0.020) (0.009) (0.023) (0.005) (0.011)
Observations 63545 21134 36686 12203 72562 24266 55734 18533
Number of firms 9139 3071 5422 1813 10826 3500 9150 3057
m1 (p) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
m2 (p) 0.82 0.08 0.38 0.17 0.07 0.11 0.10 0.05
Hansen (p) 0.17 0.37 0.09 0.23 0.47 0.63 0.08 0.46
Notes: The table reports coefficients and standard deviations in parantheses. The sample period is 1999-2007 except for retail which covers 2000-2007. The dependent variable is
trade credit extended scaled by sales. Proces_Inv, BankLoans, Profits, and Liquidity are scaled by sales. Risk is a scale free measure of the likelihood of company failure. Size is the
logarithm of real assets. Firms are considered to be large if their mean real assets are in the top quarter of the distribution of the average real assets for all firms operating in the same
sector and industry. Firms are not allowed to transit between categories. The table also reports the p-value for the Hansen test, for first-order (m1) and second-order (m2) serial
correlation. Columns 4, and 6 report the m3 test for serial correlation instead of the m2. See Notes to Table 2 and the data appendix for more details. *, **, *** denote significance at
10, 5 and 1 percent level.Table 6. Trade credit taken – diversion and inventory management theories
Dependent variable: All Small Large All Small Large All Small Large
TCtaken SYS-GMM Hausman-Taylor Random Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Total_Inv 0.128*** 0.129*** 0.087 0.033*** 0.039*** 0.025*** 0.038*** 0.047*** 0.022***
(0.038) (0.042) (0.075) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
BankLoans -0.086*** -0.117*** -0.103** -0.263*** -0.270*** -0.249*** -0.254*** -0.263*** -0.244***
(0.029) (0.033) (0.050) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003)
Risk 0.017*** 0.018*** 0.021*** 0.012*** 0.013*** 0.010*** 0.013*** 0.014*** 0.010***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.005) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Profits 0.085 0.050 0.190 -0.074*** -0.077*** -0.055*** -0.065*** -0.066*** -0.053***
(0.070) (0.069) (0.179) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004)
Liquid -0.095*** -0.144*** 0.012 -0.035*** -0.033*** -0.041*** -0.039*** -0.039*** -0.043***
(0.024) (0.028) (0.047) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Size 0.004 0.004 0.038*** 0.020*** 0.027*** 0.005*** 0.014*** 0.026*** -0.002***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.014) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Age -0.025*** -0.025*** -0.033*** -0.025*** -0.028*** -0.016*** -0.024*** -0.028*** -0.016***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Pdiff 0.163*** 0.133*** 0.214*** 0.143*** 0.117*** 0.222*** 0.144*** 0.116*** 0.222***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.019) (0.004) (0.005) (0.008) (0.004) (0.004) (0.008)
Pserv -0.027*** -0.029*** -0.033* -0.051*** -0.050*** -0.043*** -0.053*** -0.050*** -0.047***
(0.008) (0.007) (0.018) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005)
Retail 0.054*** 0.052*** 0.074*** 0.086*** 0.080*** 0.096*** 0.085*** 0.079*** 0.096***
(0.007) (0.008) (0.017) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003)
Wholesale 0.136*** 0.138*** 0.117*** 0.141*** 0.140*** 0.133*** 0.145*** 0.141*** 0.138***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.015) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Observations 575731 431929 143802 575731 431929 143802 575731 431929 143802
Number of firms 81287 61160 20127 81287 61160 20127 81287 61160 20127
m1 (p) 0.00 0.00 0.00
m5 (p) 0.46 0.76 0.48
Hansen (p) 0.00 0.00 0.34
rho 0.84 0.83 0.83 0.78 0.76 0.82
R-squared 0.25 0.28 0.22
Notes: The table reports coefficients and standard deviations in parantheses. The sample period is 2000-2007. The dependent variable is trade credit taken scaled by total assets. Total_Inv, BankLoans, Profits, and
Liquidity are scaled by assets. Pdiff and Pserv denote the proportion of differentiated and service inputs used by firms (the proportion of standardized inputs is the reference category). Retail and wholesale are
dummy variables taking the value 1 if firms operate in retail and wholesale, respectively. Firms are considered to be large if their mean assets are in the top quarter of the distribution of the mean assets for all firms
operating in the same industry. The table also reports the p-value for the Hansen test, for first-order (m1), and fifth-order (m5) serial correlation. See Notes to Table 2 and the data appendix for more details.Table 7. Trade credit taken – accounting for the proportion of processed inventories
Dependent variable: All Small Large All Small Large All Small Large
TCtaken SYS-GMM Hausman-Taylor Random Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Total_Inv 0.155*** 0.159*** 0.152** 0.019*** 0.024*** 0.017*** 0.023*** 0.031*** 0.015***
(0.041) (0.045) (0.077) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
BankLoans -0.081*** -0.114*** -0.038 -0.267*** -0.273*** -0.254*** -0.259*** -0.267*** -0.250***
(0.031) (0.034) (0.051) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003)
Risk 0.015*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.013*** 0.014*** 0.011*** 0.014*** 0.015*** 0.012***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Profits 0.098 0.076 0.368** -0.063*** -0.068*** -0.040*** -0.052*** -0.056*** -0.034***
(0.070) (0.071) (0.173) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004)
Liquid -0.106*** -0.146*** -0.064 -0.040*** -0.039*** -0.046*** -0.045*** -0.044*** -0.051***
(0.024) (0.029) (0.045) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Size -0.000 -0.005 -0.002 0.015*** 0.023*** -0.002*** 0.011*** 0.023*** -0.006***
(0.006) (0.007) (0.012) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Age 0.160*** 0.130*** 0.237*** 0.142*** 0.117*** 0.215*** 0.141*** 0.115*** 0.216***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.019) (0.004) (0.005) (0.008) (0.004) (0.004) (0.008)
Pdiff -0.022*** -0.022*** -0.029*** -0.023*** -0.026*** -0.016*** -0.024*** -0.028*** -0.017***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Pserv -0.007 -0.018** 0.016 -0.027*** -0.029*** -0.013** -0.030*** -0.029*** -0.017***
(0.008) (0.007) (0.018) (0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.002) (0.003) (0.005)
Retail 0.066*** 0.065*** 0.089*** 0.080*** 0.074*** 0.094*** 0.081*** 0.074*** 0.095***
(0.009) (0.010) (0.016) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003)
Wholesale 0.150*** 0.157*** 0.158*** 0.138*** 0.136*** 0.134*** 0.142*** 0.138*** 0.139***
(0.009) (0.010) (0.016) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
PropProces_Inv -0.048*** -0.043** -0.098*** -0.004*** -0.001 -0.017*** -0.005*** -0.001** -0.020***
(0.016) (0.018) (0.029) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Observations 510719 382369 128350 510719 382369 128350 510719 382369 128350
Number of firms 73860 55357 18503 73860 55357 18503 73860 55357 18503
m1 (p) 0.00 0.00 0.00
m5 (p) 0.86 0.60 0.78
Hansen (p) 0.00 0.00 0.00
rho 0.85 0.84 0.84 0.78 0.76 0.82
R-squared 0.26 0.29 0.24
Notes: See notes to Table 6 and Table 3. PropProces_Inv is the share of work in progress and finished goods inventories in all inventories. Firms are considered to be large if their mean real assets are in
the top quarter of the distribution of the mean assets for all firms operating in the same industry. See Notes to Table 6 and the data appendix for more details.